by Sebastien GOULARD
On July 16, 2026, the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) was officially established in Shanghai. Twenty-nine countries signed the agreement creating this new international organization, and additional members may join in the near future.
This new framework for international cooperation was launched at China’s initiative. Chinese President Xi Jinping first proposed the project to the international community in July 2025 and reiterated the proposal in October during the 33rd Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in South Korea.
United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres attended the WAICO’s inauguration and signing ceremony, suggesting that future coordination between WAICO and United Nations agencies may be envisioned.
WAICO’s Objectives
This new international body pursues three main objectives:
- strengthening cooperation in innovation to ensure that all countries can benefit from the development of artificial intelligence;
- promoting policies aimed at reducing inequalities in the field of artificial intelligence so that AI does not create new disparities between developed and developing countries;
- fostering shared governance for the benefit of all through the adoption of common global standards and norms.
To achieve these objectives, China has proposed a five-year plan aimed at training as many stakeholders as possible in Asia, Latin America, and Africa in artificial intelligence while establishing AI cooperation centers across different continents.
The Battle for Standards
In his inaugural address, President Xi Jinping declared that “the development of AI should not be a solo performance led by a single country, but rather a symphony of international cooperation.” Yet within this symphony, China would inevitably serve as the conductor, prompting some countries to question the implications of this new organization dedicated to artificial intelligence.
China dominates the artificial intelligence sector alongside the United States. Its strength lies in its mastery of virtually every component of the AI value chain. First, China is the global leader in the extraction of rare earth elements required for semiconductor manufacturing and controls their exports, thereby influencing other countries’ access to these critical resources. Thanks to its electricity generation capacity, the highest in the world, reaching nearly 10,580 TWh in 2025, or approximately one-third of global electricity production—China is able to develop new data centers. It currently ranks second only to the United States in data center capacity. Finally, AI models developed in China have become highly popular beyond the country’s borders, although, as in the United States, certain strategically important models remain restricted to selected domestic companies. The semiconductor industry remains the only major segment that has yet to come under Chinese dominance.
To strengthen its position and challenge that of the United States, China is now turning its attention to the standards that will govern the AI sector. In the absence of an international regulatory framework, every country currently follows its own rules regarding the use of artificial intelligence. China’s initiative aims to establish a common framework for AI development. WAICO should also enable Beijing to promote its own standards internationally, thereby consolidating its leadership.
Sino-American Competition in Artificial Intelligence
The creation of this new organization comes at a time when competition between China and the United States in artificial intelligence is intensifying. WAICO can therefore be viewed as China’s response to U.S. policy.
The United States is gradually introducing a system to control access to the world’s most advanced AI models, following the same logic as its existing export controls on semiconductors, which are regarded as strategic technologies. Consequently, access restrictions on cutting-edge AI models are being imposed on countries considered high-risk. Conversely, the United States is cooperating with selected countries designated as trusted partners, granting them access to certain AI models while helping establish secure supply chains for the resources required by the AI industry. The early stages of this cooperation were discussed during the most recent G7 Summit in Évian. China, Russia, Venezuela, Cuba, and Myanmar, all members of the new WAICO, are, unsurprisingly, absent from the United States’ list of trusted partners.
However, even among U.S. allies, President Trump’s policies are prompting some governments to question the extent of their dependence on American artificial intelligence. What if Washington were to make access conditional? The European Union is seeking to develop its own technologies in line with the principle of European technological sovereignty. In June 2024, the EU adopted its Artificial Intelligence Act, which aims, among other things, to manage the risks associated with AI. Among the practices deemed unacceptable are AI-based social scoring systems. The European Union has therefore adopted an approach centered on protecting its citizens and would only be willing to participate in a global AI governance framework if WAICO were to uphold the same fundamental values.
Cautious Powers
Faced with growing Sino-American competition, most countries have chosen not to choose. Many of the signatories to WAICO’s founding agreement are countries from the Global South. Yet today, with the exception of China, few of them can genuinely be considered AI powers.
According to Tortoise Media’s Global AI Index, among WAICO’s members only Malaysia (24th), Brazil (25th), and Russia (30th), together with China (2nd), rank among the world’s thirty leading AI powers. It is also worth noting that among the BRICS+ members, India, the United Arab Emirates, both major AI players, and Egypt have not, at this stage, chosen to join the organization, preferring instead to observe how the initiative develops.
WAICO’s future will depend largely on its relationship with the world’s other leading AI powers. Will it become a bloc led exclusively by China, or will cooperation prove possible with the European Union, the United States, and other non-member countries?
It should also be emphasized that many aspects of WAICO remain unknown. Will its governance resemble that of other Chinese-led initiatives, characterized by flexibility but limited institutional clarity? Or will it instead evolve into a more formalized organization, comparable in some respects to the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act?
While it is already known that WAICO will be headquartered in Shanghai, neither its budget nor its institutional rules, including its decision-making procedures, have yet been made public. To establish its credibility, member states will need to define the organization’s governance without delay. And although China is unquestionably WAICO’s leading power, Beijing will also have to ensure that the organization serves the interests of all its members rather than its own alone.
