by Sebastien GOULARD
The war between Israel and Iran has highlighted the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz. Despite a vote by its parliament on June 22, 2025, following U.S. strikes on the country’s nuclear complex, Tehran did not dare to close this passage. The ceasefire between Israel and Iran, announced by Donald Trump, has been upheld, and Tehran no longer openly threatens maritime routes through the Strait of Hormuz. A blockage of the strait would trigger a global crisis that all parties seek to avoid.
A Strategic Chokepoint
Nearly twenty percent of global oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making it as strategic as the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, or the Strait of Malacca. For countries such as the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula, free access to the Strait of Hormuz is vital, as the majority of their hydrocarbon exports pass through it, with no viable alternative routes except for pipelines.
At its narrowest point, the strait is less than forty kilometers wide and only sixty meters deep, making it highly vulnerable to threats. Control of the strait is shared by three countries: the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Iran. However, the bulk of maritime traffic passes through the deeper waters controlled by Oman.
A Recurring Threat
This is not the first time Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic. During the Iran-Iraq war, freedom of navigation through the strait was already under threat in what became known as the “Tanker War.” Both belligerents launched targeted attacks on ships, including those not directly involved in the conflict but transporting Iranian or Iraqi oil. To end these attacks, the United States increased its presence in the Persian Gulf and responded positively to Kuwait’s request to protect its tankers carrying Iraqi oil. Nevertheless, Iraqi forces mistakenly attacked the USS Stark frigate.
Despite repeated threats, Iran has never actually closed the Strait of Hormuz to traffic. In 2008, during a naval crisis with Washington, Tehran issued such a threat, and repeated it in 2011 when international sanctions against its nuclear program were tightened.
A blockade would be relatively easy to implement with mines in the narrowest part of the strait, underscoring the vulnerability of international maritime trade routes. In the Red Sea, international cargo vessels are already targeted by Houthi rebel attacks using drones and rockets, leaving merchant ships relatively defenseless. While piracy was once a major threat to maritime trade, today it is states or proto-states that directly challenge freedom of navigation.
Consequences of a Potential Blockade
Middle Eastern oil fuels the global economy. A blockade would affect the world’s largest industrial powers, particularly Asian economies. Around 84% of the oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz is destined for China, India, Japan, and South Korea. While China imports nearly 90% of Iran’s crude oil exports, it also purchases a significant share of its oil (1.6 million barrels per day) from Saudi Arabia; a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would be disastrous for its economy. Similarly, India imports part of its oil from the Middle East, although volumes have declined in favor of Russian oil.
Europe is less exposed to a potential blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Its supplies are more diversified, with the United States, Norway, and Kazakhstan being its primary oil sources. However, any blockade would drive up oil prices, with significant social and political consequences.
One potential beneficiary of a blockade could be Russia, given Asian economies’—particularly China’s—dependency on Middle Eastern oil. These nations would then have to seek alternative suppliers outside the Persian Gulf. Likewise, the United States could strengthen its role as an energy provider to Europe and the rest of the world in the event of a blockade—a point the American president emphasized on his social network “Thruth.” However, a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would be bad news for the global economy, leading to higher energy costs and weakening growth prospects.
Iran itself would be severely affected by such a blockade. The country’s economy is heavily dependent on petroleum product exports, which account for over 50% of its total exports. The regime of the Mullahs would sink into a deep economic and political crisis, threatening its very survival. Furthermore, such a move would gravely damage Iran’s relations with its key trading partners, foremost among them China. Beijing has increased its investments in the Middle East in recent years and asserted its ambitions as a regional mediator—particularly between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023. The current crisis and the threat of a blockade undermine this position.
The Need for Cooperation
Despite shared economic interests, relations among Persian Gulf coastal states remain tense, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia. No cooperative mechanism currently includes all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf. A robust form of multilateralism does exist through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), comprising Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman. Though the GCC has experienced crises—such as the diplomatic dispute between Qatar and the other members led by Saudi Arabia from 2017 to 2021—it remains an essential and effective tool for regional cooperation.
Looking ahead, other regional powers such as Iraq and Iran, despite their differences, will also need to consider stronger cooperation with the Gulf states. No blackmail should be tolerated: freedom of navigation must not be compromised in the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Hormuz must remain open to vessels from all nations. In the future, the success of new economic corridors such as the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) will depend on ensuring absolute security in the Persian Gulf.
Author: Dr. Sebastien Goulard is the founder and editor-in-chief of Global Connectivities.
