by Sebastien GOULARD
The war in Ukraine is casting doubt over the use of the Eurasian land bridge connecting China to Europe, the main corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Poland’s decision to fully close its border with Belarus has brought the rail line linking Europe to China to a standstill.
Polish Intransigence
Warsaw’s decision is motivated by the incursion of Russian drones into its territory, and the upcoming “Zapad-2025” joint military exercise between Russia and Belarus, taking place just a few kilometers from the Polish border. These actions are being closely monitored by Poland and its European partners, who fear a potential Russian aggression. To signal its concern over Russian threats, the Polish government unilaterally decided to completely shut its border with Belarus, thereby severing railway links connecting the country to Central Asia and China.
Near Terespol, in eastern Poland, both local and foreign businesses have heavily invested in the development of rail and logistics infrastructure in Małaszewicze, transforming it into a hub between the European Union and China. The border closure underlines the seriousness of the situation for Warsaw. With the border sealed, Belarusian truck drivers can no longer cross into Poland either. Some goods—such as food and medicine—could expire due to the blockade.
A Major Belt and Road Axis
The (temporary?) closure of this route significantly impacts the development of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Although the BRI includes several corridors, the most important one remains the land route linking China to Europe via Russia and Belarus. Nearly €25 billion worth of goods are exchanged annually by rail between China and the EU, most of which pass through Poland. The closure of the Belarus border can also be interpreted as a diplomatic blow to China, especially in the context of ongoing trade tensions between Brussels and Beijing.
Although the value of goods transported via the Europe–China railway is relatively small compared to maritime trade—less than 5% of total trade between China and the EU—the symbolic impact is significant. It marks a setback for China’s flagship connectivity project.
China is thus facing mounting challenges for several of its BRI-related initiatives. Even before the Poland–Belarus border closure, rail trade between China and Europe, although growing in volume, remained unbalanced in China’s favor. Since the invasion of Ukraine, many European companies have been reluctant to ship goods through Russian territory due to insurance concerns.
The southern corridor, which passes through Iran, has never managed to gain structure, despite Tehran’s stated interest in developing new trade ties with China while bypassing Western sanctions. Likewise, in Pakistan, China faces difficulties in constructing the economic corridor linking its western provinces to the Gulf of Oman, mainly due to Pakistan’s internal security issues.
In Russia, despite the much-vaunted “no-limits friendship” between Moscow and Beijing, BRI-related projects have stalled due to Russia’s economic challenges. After years of success, during which ambitious Silk Road projects were launched, the Chinese initiative is now struggling due to the evolving geopolitical landscape. In addition to a persistent global trend toward protectionism—strengthened since Donald Trump’s first term—the deterioration of international relations in Ukraine and the Middle East is hampering Beijing’s global connectivity ambitions.
Some Alternatives?
The closure of the Poland–Belarus border is likely to have limited consequences for other overland trade routes between China and Europe. The corridor running through the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea entirely bypasses Russian territory. While promising, this route has limited capacity compared to the Eurasian land bridge, and shipping goods along it is slower and more expensive. If the crisis persists, companies may be forced to turn to maritime trade. Despite being affected by international tensions—particularly in the Red Sea—maritime trade remains more predictable.
A (Limited) Chinese Support for Poland?
The Polish decision has not gone unnoticed in Beijing. During a visit to Poland on September 16, 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attempted to convince his Polish counterpart Radosław Sikorski to reopen the border to allow China–Europe freight trains to pass. Poland responded that national security takes precedence over commercial interests.
To soften Warsaw’s stance, Beijing may seek to pay more attention to Poland. During his visit, Wang Yi declared China’s support for Poland’s bid to join the G20, as the country has now surpassed a GDP of $1 trillion. However, this alone is unlikely to sway the Polish government.
On the Chinese side, the blocking of this Silk Road corridor is unlikely to prompt a shift in its foreign policy; China remains relatively accommodating toward Russia in the eyes of Europeans. However, it is possible that Beijing will exert its influence over Moscow to avoid future military exercises near the Poland–Belarus border that could be perceived as provocative. Still, recent incursions of Russian drones and military aircraft into EU countries such as Poland, Romania, and Estonia indicate that a threshold has been crossed, and returning to the previous status quo will be difficult.
Under these conditions, China appears relatively powerless. It cannot openly pressure its strategic partner without risking embarrassment, and its economic interests in Russia continue to grow. Nonetheless, this situation sends a strong signal to Beijing: one of its key BRI projects is being undermined. The “Eurasian land bridge” had been the most advanced component of the BRI—and it is now jeopardized by Moscow’s foreign policy, over which Beijing has little to no control.
Poland’s Position Enjoys Broad Support
Notably, neither the European Commission nor any EU Member State has formally objected to Poland’s decision. Europe appears to support Warsaw’s cautious stance, even at the expense of Chinese connectivity projects. Washington also welcomes the closure, as it weakens EU–China relations.
Beijing seems unaware that the war in Ukraine, and China’s explicit or implicit support for Russia, is harming its relationship with Europe. National security now takes precedence over economic cooperation.
