by Muhammad Asif NOOR
The shifting sands of global alliances have once again brought Europe to a crossroads, with recent developments underscoring a growing desire for independence amid strained ties with the United States. Ursula von der Leyen’s recent State of the Union address, delivered with a sense of urgency, framed Europe as being at war—not with a traditional adversary but with a world where interdependence has become a double-edged sword. Her repeated emphasis on independence signals a pivot, driven by the realization that reliance on Washington, particularly under the current U.S. administration, carries a cost beyond mere policy differences. This sentiment echoes across the continent, where leaders and citizens alike grapple with the implications of a transatlantic relationship that feels increasingly one-sided.
Two years ago the European Commission’s agenda was focused on China. Brussels pushed forward with trade defense measures, particularly against Chinese electric vehicles, and deployed new regulatory tools in procurement and subsidies. At the time, this was seen as an effort to redefine global economic rules while protecting European industries. In contrast, this year’s address lacked the same level of confidence. China was still framed as a competitor in clean energy and electric cars and as a partner of Russia and North Korea, but the more pressing concern was the United States.
The turning point came with the trade deal concluded in July. Faced with President Trump’s threat of tariffs of up to thirty percent, Brussels accepted a compromise that set the rate at fifteen percent. Von der Leyen presented the agreement as a necessary step to prevent a trade war and preserve market access for European exporters. The dominant reaction across major member states was a sense of subordination rather than relief. In France nearly two-thirds of respondents viewed the outcome as a concession that weakened Europe’s standing. The gap between the Commission’s defense of pragmatism and the public’s sense of subordination exposed the depth of discontent with the state of the transatlantic partnership.
This dissatisfaction is not confined to trade. President Trump’s second presidency has reopened questions about the very meaning of the West. For decades the transatlantic alliance formed the core of a liberal order underpinned by shared values and mutual trust. Stewart Patrick recently argued in Foreign Affairs that this unity is eroding to the point of dissolution. The United States now pursues an overtly nationalist course that sidelines allies, imposes unilateral tariffs, and treats security guarantees as conditional bargaining chips. The West as a coherent geopolitical entity is giving way to fragmented alignments shaped by shifting national interests.
For Europe, this erosion creates both exposure and opportunity. NATO remains the foundation of collective defense, but the certainty of U.S. commitment is no longer taken for granted. On trade, the asymmetry of bargaining power has left Europe in a defensive position. On technology and regulation, Brussels insists on autonomy but faces pushback from Washington. The idea of independence resonates in speeches, but translating it into policy requires resources, unity, and political will that are not yet evident.
At the same time, Europe cannot ignore the changing global environment. Middle powers across the Global South are building flexible partnerships that allow them to hedge between great powers rather than align firmly with one camp. Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa are deepening their roles as independent actors. Europe is beginning to adopt similar strategies, seeking to diversify its trade relationships and open channels with emerging economies. This trend may accelerate if transatlantic ties remain strained, pushing Europe into patterns of behavior once associated primarily with non-Western states.
The difficulty is that Europe is pulled in multiple directions. It seeks to limit dependence on the United States without weakening security guarantees. It seeks to protect its industries from Chinese competition while still engaging Beijing on trade and climate. It seeks to assert regulatory leadership but cannot insulate itself from Washington’s challenges to its standards. The balance is fragile, and the margin for error is shrinking.
Von der Leyen’s framing of independence captures a genuine desire among Europeans to regain agency, but it also exposes the limitations of rhetoric without strategy. Independence requires more than defensive compromises in trade negotiations. It requires sustained investment in defense capabilities, stronger industrial policies, and a clear definition of Europe’s role in a world no longer organized around transatlantic solidarity. Until such steps are taken, the notion of independence risks remaining more aspirational than real.
The fading of the West does not necessarily mean another sets of challenges, but it does signal the end of an era when the United States and Europe moved in step as the anchor of a rules-based order. For Europe, the task ahead is to manage this transition without succumbing to further challenges. Whether it succeeds will depend on its ability to turn the language of independence into a credible foundation for policy.
