by Sebastien Goulard
The End of Tensions Between Azerbaijan and Armenia
Before the Anchorage summit between the American and Russian presidents on the issue of Ukraine, Donald Trump hosted Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Washington on August 7 to sign a peace agreement between the two Caucasus states. Until then, relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan had been extremely tense; they had reached a peak in September 2023, when Azerbaijani forces swiftly invaded the unrecognized state of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian population of the region, around 150,000 people, was forced to flee to Armenia.
The takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Baku did not resolve all disputes between the two countries. Azerbaijan also sought to secure access to its Nakhchivan exclave, located between Turkey and Armenia and separated from the rest of Azerbaijani territory by Armenia’s Syunik region. Baku therefore aimed to seize the Zangezur corridor to Nakhchivan, which would have meant controlling Armenia’s border with Iran. The agreement signed in Washington addresses this issue directly. Nakhchivan will now be connected to the rest of Azerbaijan through a new road, which will be administered by the United States.
The Meghri Road, or Trump International Road for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)
The TRIPP, stretching 43 kilometers, will allow Azerbaijan to link its Nakhchivan exclave to the rest of its territory via Armenia’s Syunik province. A new railway connection will also link Baku directly to Turkey. All infrastructure along this corridor will remain under Armenian jurisdiction (with customs checks carried out by Yerevan), but the project will be developed by a consortium selected by the United States.
According to early estimates, more than 50 million tons of goods are expected to transit through this future route each year.
Normalization of U.S.–Azerbaijan Relations
Above all, this agreement signals a stronger U.S. role in the South Caucasus, and in Azerbaijan in particular. Following the signing of the tripartite agreement, Washington and Baku elevated their relations to the level of a strategic partnership, enabling closer cooperation, especially in energy and defense. This partnership was made possible by suspending Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which had prohibited U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan in response to Baku’s policies during the first Nagorno-Karabakh war (1988–1994). This marks a major victory for President Ilham Aliyev, who now sees his country emerging as a potential U.S. partner. For Azerbaijan, closer ties with Washington will help diversify its foreign policy, especially in the context of strained relations with Russia. The suspension of Section 907 also legitimizes Azerbaijan’s annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh. The first war against the Karabakh separatists had been led by the current president’s father, who became Azerbaijan’s leader after a coup in 1993.
The new strategic partnership is also expected to foster cooperation in renewable energy. Azerbaijan aims for renewables to make up 30% of its energy mix by 2030, partly to increase energy exports to Europe. Together with Georgia, Romania, and Hungary, Baku is working on the construction of the longest undersea power cable in the Caspian region.
An Opening for Armenia
Armenia is also expected to benefit from strengthened ties with the United States. On the eve of Donald Trump’s inauguration in January 2025, Yerevan and Washington signed a charter for enhanced partnership aimed at renovating Armenia’s infrastructure (particularly in the energy sector), while encouraging closer ties with Western powers and reducing Moscow’s influence.Under the new agreement, Armenia has entrusted the Zangezur corridor to U.S. administration for 99 years. Washington will oversee the development of the region, including new transport links, as well as fiber-optic and electricity networks. Armenia is thus expected to be more fully integrated into regional development dynamics.
But Armenia Remains Wary
Nonetheless, this agreement is unlikely to radically change Armenia’s foreign policy. Yerevan is indeed seeking to diversify its partnerships and draw closer to the United States and the European Union. However, Azerbaijan has attached conditions to its recognition of the agreement, requiring Armenia to revise its constitution and renounce any territorial claims against Baku. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan knows that this demand will be difficult to meet, given the deep attachment of Armenians to their constitution.
The Armenian leader is also cautious about the absence of U.S. security guarantees. For now, there are no plans for an American military presence on Armenian soil.
A Transformation of South Caucasus Geopolitics?
The new road has the potential to reshape the region’s geopolitical landscape. Although Moscow welcomed the initiative, the agreement marks a decline in Russia’s influence. Yerevan’s growing ties with Western capitals, coupled with recent tensions between Baku and Moscow, highlight this weakening. Yet, as analyst Narek Sukiasyan notes, Russia could still benefit if TRIPP connects to the Armenian railway network, which is managed by a subsidiary of a Russian company.
The project also disrupts Iran’s interests in the region. Until now, Armenia conducted much of its international trade via its border with Iran. In the future, Yerevan could more easily trade with the wider world through its Turkish and Azerbaijani neighbors. The recent visit of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Yerevan on August 19 reflects Tehran’s and Yerevan’s shared interest in maintaining good relations. During the visit, agreements were signed to boost trade and construct a new bridge between the two countries. Iran’s greatest concern, however, is that TRIPP could allow for a U.S. presence along its borders.
The agreement also reveals the weakness of the European Union in the region. It is telling that Washington, not Brussels, has assumed responsibility for securing peace in the South Caucasus—even though the region is strategically vital for Europe. Since 2021, the EU has maintained a partnership and cooperation agreement with Armenia, alongside a similar agreement with Baku dating back to 1999. Yet during the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, the EU failed to bring the parties together around a peace framework. It will not be Europe but the United States that ensures development and connectivity in the Zangezur corridor. Nonetheless, stability and improved connectivity in the South Caucasus should benefit Europe as well, by boosting trade.
TRIPP will not resolve all disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia (especially regarding Nagorno-Karabakh), and many obstacles remain to its construction. Yet the agreement signals a willingness to ease tensions and lays the groundwork for the South Caucasus to emerge as a potential hub linking Asia and Europe. To achieve this, however, Armenia and Azerbaijan will need to continue cooperating.
Author: Dr. Sebastien Goulard is the founder and editor-in-chief of Global Connectivities.
