by WANG Li
On May 20th, President Trump announced that “We will truly be completing the job that President Reagan started 40 years ago, forever ending the missile threat to the American homeland.” Compared to his vow to end the Ukraine war in 24 hours not long ago, this time, he meant it since his defense secretary and top military aides were present witnessing his remark in the White House.
In 1983 when was the heyday of the Cold War, President Reagan vowed to start what was termed of “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI). With dubbing “Star War”. It aimed to establish a space-based defense shield against nuclear missiles from the hostile sides. Although it foiled in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, now the Trump administration has decided to resume this plan in the name of “Golden Dome”, referring to “a state-of-the-art missile defense system covering the U.S. that could shoot down ballistic, hypersonic and nuclear missiles — even drones — from land and outer space.” (Thomas Novelly, 2025)
For sure, this is a hyper-cost project as Trump exposed his “Golden Dome” to take only three years to complete and be “very close to 100%” effective while costing $175 billion. Despite this, defense policy experts are uncertain to say that while the immediate fate of the nationwide shield is tied to short-term funding working through Congress, it may ultimately require a long-term commitment of more defense dollars or strategic trade-offs, such as cutting the size of the Army to deliver the ambitious vision being pitched to the American people.
In addition to his proposed $1 trillion defense budget for fiscal 2026, the next challenge to the Trump administration is some of the trade-offs to pay for Golden Dome, e.g. the service was considering a massive cut of up to 90,000 active-duty troops or in Hegseth’s words that U.S. Army needs to become “leaner”, adding it must prioritize investments such as “air and missile defense including through the Golden Dome for America.”
Perhaps, first and foremost is that the formidable challenge comes from China’s response to the U.S. “Golden Dome” as Beijing along with its partners around the world have vowed to oppose to any state pursuing the exclusive security at the expanse of and to the detriment of the security of other states. Since the destinies of the peoples of all countries are interrelated, they are supposed required to adhere to the principle of equal and indivisible security on global and regional levels, and move to build comprehensive, integrated and sustainable security all over the world on a collective basis.
Recently, Chinese official statements and foreign policy briefings have shown that China has been committed to the global strategic stability, referring to its particular concern that any nuclear-weapon state has rejected the concept of the strategic equilibrium in the arms control. It argues that even during the heyday of the Cold War, the two nuclear superpowers had observed the mutual nuclear deterrence which was featured by the bipolar other than unipolar dominance. According to a strategic report titled as “An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War” (1985), to avoid nuclear war, it was the key to maintain the capability of military forces and the credibility of political intentions and revolve. It is worth noting that mutual assured destruction (MAD) refers to a condition other than any military strategy or an objective. The rationale behind the policy-making elites of the sides then made all earnest efforts to avoid “seeking a first-strike capability” and “planning for a nuclear demonstration shot” in Europe [or Asia] (G. Allison, 1985). Given this, the nuclear powers’ shared concern would bring forth a powerful incentive to work together in maintaining a strategic equilibrium.
Accordingly, China strongly opposes to the United States, the most advanced nuclear-weapon state to emplace its long-range missile systems of this and other similar classes within the relevant military allies not only by nuclear weapon States, but also by their non-nuclear allies with the objectives to conduct “deep precision strikes”, “kill chains”, “counterstrike capabilities”. They are seen as such provocative activities that undermine regional stability and global security.
Moreover, China has deplored U.S. commitment to maintaining “no peer” approach in foreign affairs since the largest nuclear-weapon state has destabilized the already existing strategic equilibrium through deliberate deployment of the nuclear warheads to the frontiers of other nuclear-weapon states in an attempt to establish or expand permanent footholds in such areas which are particularly sensitive to them. All are intended to project military power, exert maximum coercion and commit other hostile activities, e.g. “to perform decapitating and disarming strikes while enhancing capabilities for missile interception.” This is one of the tactics that the U.S. has used to threaten the core security interests of the states all over the world including other nuclear-weapon states concerned. Yet, like “Star Wars” during the 1980s, Trump’s “Golden Dome” has been criticized as ”reckless 2.0 Star Wars” and one of the most irresponsible shows like Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.
China has not only rejected but also warned the potential risks of U.S. pushing for the project of “Golden Dome for America” since it aims to establish unconstrained, global and multi-domain missile defense system to protect against any missile threats, including all types of missiles from “peer and near-peer adversaries”. In doing so, the United States has evidently discarded the universally-observed rule of the balance of power, which has appealed to all nuclear-weapon powers to take the responsibility to serve international security in line with the strategic stability as it is the central and fundamental principle of maintaining global strategic stability.
Author: Wang Li is professor of international relations at Jilin International Studies University, China. He studied for his BA in international history, MA in international affairs & diplomacy and PhD in international relations & law respectively in China, the U.S. and UK with a focus on the great powers’ foreign policy.
This article reflects the author’s own opinions and not necessarily the views of Global Connectivities.
