by WANG Li
In January, Chinese leader Xi talked with EU Council Head Costa. He reiterated that China has always regarded Europe as an important pole in a multipolar world, and firmly supported the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. On March 7th, Chinese top diplomat Wang reaffirmed that the diplomatic ties between China and the EU are seen as the most valuable asset which is built on mutual respect, reciprocal benefits and the consensus on multilateralism and cooperation.
Now the question arises that amid the uncertain global landscape after the Trump took office, how could China and the EU perceive each other’s core interests according to concept of the “empathy of geopolitics”? This piece sets to examine their compatible approaches to the sides to the multipolarity in line with the principles of the U.N. Charter and international law. In so doing, they need to grasp each other’s core interests and common security concerns in a long run.
In 1975, China and the EU (then the European Economic Community EEC) came to normalize the relationship that ushered in a new era of formal contacts between the two ends of Eurasia. Geopolitically, it has been seen the “heartland” of the world. It is argued that the spatial distance between China and the EU would prove to be a positive factor leading to the free promotion of two major economies in the future world, and they also tended to see each other as the champions of the world order based on multipolarity rather than the bipolarity by the superpowers. It is true that the EU had seen China as a huge and rapidly rising market while nearly banning no dual-usable high-technologies to China from the later 1970s until 2016 when the first Trump administration admitted the failure of engagement with China. Despite the EU to pursue an ambitious “strategic autonomy”, in 2020 a strategic report from the transatlantic community argued that the rise of China and its increasing solidarity with Russia had contributed to the global equilibrium in favor of the Sino-Russian geopolitical stakes in Eurasia.
Yet, the crucial moment came on February 24, 2022 when the launch of the war by Russia in Ukraine which is a sovereign state recognized by the international society including China. NATO-EU immediately ramped up to define Russia as the most danger to Europe, but China has adopted a “principled position” to appeal to ceasefire and the peace talks between the contending parties. Since then, on one hand, China has endorsed all states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity in line with the principles of the UN Charter while it insists on the Helsinki Accord, also known as “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act” which was based on the consensus to guarantee “the indivisibility of security in Europe and common interest in the development of cooperation throughout Europe.” In addition, China has echoed Hans Morgenthau’s doctrine that it is fatal for any state or a group of states to act in disregards to the legitimate security concerns of all sides involved. Given this, China is obliged to call on reconstructing an effective and inclusive security regime in Europe.
For the sound reasons, the EU has seen China’s neutral stance as a de facto support of Russia’s aggression of Ukraine. Consequently, it has only geared up for the existing process of polarizing the world between the Sino-Russian entente and U.S.-led alliance. The dilemma remains that China’s neutrality on the war has deeply affected its already strained relations with the U.S. and EU, which are the leading trade partners of China in the world. It also likely loses Ukraine as a major trade partner and reliable participant of the BRI in Europe. Accordingly, President Xi has kept phone calls to the U.S. and the EU leaders since March 2022 revealing China’s deep concerns with the ongoing war in Ukraine. For Beijing, the U.S. has ramped up to forge an alliance system in Indo-Pacific to deter the rise of China economically, technologically and geopolitically. It is urgent for China to maintain its strategic partnership with Russia while preserving its largest economic and technological sources in the West, notably Europe.
It is obvious that China and the EU have different strategic goals towards the outcome of the war. Since the U.S. and its allies have seen China as the systemic rival globally, it is necessary for Beijing to maintain a strong entente with Moscow as is able to provide a sustainable flow of energy and advanced strategic missile technology. Meanwhile, because the EU sees Russia as the most immediate threat to Europe, it is inevitable to continue preserving the transatlantic bond under the principle of “together, it is stronger”.
There is no doubt that Russia’s war has wider implications for European and international security. In view of the new momentum for negotiations for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, China is aware of the significance to maintain a dynamic and practical relationship with the EU. First, China has called for a powerful and prosperous Europe to play a major role in the multipolar world. Second, China feels more reasonable to work with the EU to tackle global challenges e.g. climate change, terrorism and many others, and jointly make positive contributions to world peace, stability and development. Moreover, some Chinese opine that the rise of China has likely aroused Europeans to reflect on the sets of values, norms, and principles that Europe stands for in terms of “strategic autonomy”. Towards that end, it is argued that China and the EU have the caliber and wisdom to jointly usher in a new era of multipolar world.
Author: Wang Li is Professor of international affairs & law at School of Law, Changzhou University, China. He studied for his BA in international history, MA in international affairs & diplomacy and PhD in international relations & law respectively in China, the U.S. and UK with a focus on the great powers’ foreign policy.
Email: wanglichangzhou@cczu.edu.cn
This article reflects the author’s own opinions and not necessarily the views of Global Connectivities.
